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I Love You, I Hate You: Toward a Psychology of the Hindu Deus 
Absconditus  
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Psychological studies of Hindu religion and culture routinely stress a difference between 
"East" and "West." Whether this difference reflects a certain Hindu pathology (Carstairs 
1961; Spratt 1966; Masson 1980; Kakar 1981) or normative developments relative to 
each culture (Roland 1988; Kurtz 1992), the seemingly uncontested consensus is that 
Hindu India nurtures a "collective self." Though generally finding many of these studies 
quite fascinating and often persuasive, I wish to draw attention to a dimension that is 
routinely overlooked. In an effort to paint with broad strokes a culture preoccupied with 
psychological mergers and integrations, many authors fail to take note of particular 
forms of bhakti, or devotion, that appear to contest such a preoccupation. The structural 
features of viraha bhakti (love-in-separation) and virodha bhakti (love-manifest-as-
enmity) in particular reflect and influence a psychological construction of self that is not 
merged in or integrated with the other: viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti present Hindu 
god images that model a separated-individuated self.  
Because any one religious tradition is clearly over-determined, definitive psycho- logical 
interpretations remain elusive. This is certainly the case with viraha bhakti and virodha 
bhakti. While maintaining that the two devotional models similarly reflect a separated-
individuated self, I nevertheless present competing interpretations. The competition 
issues from the difference between interpreting god imagery as either corresponding 
with or compensating for the realities of childhood (Kirkpatrick 2005). In the former case, 
the religious model repeats culturally normative developments; in the latter, the religious 
model deviates from culturally normative developments. Whether or not the 
compensation is psychologically deviant is an altogether different issue.  
The two interpretations I present here share a common point of departure in what the 
psychoanalytic anthropologist Stanley N. Kurtz calls the "new psychology of Hinduism" 
(1992: 6). Kurtz's new psychology is based upon what many contemporary 
ethnographers consider to be a "more" accurate portrait of Hindu childrearing practices. 
Where the "classical" account addresses the Hindu mother's wholesale indulgence of 
her child, the new account stresses physical indulgence accompanied 
by emotional absence. With regard to viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti, the 
compensatory interpretation argues for the facilitation of an individuated sense of self 
that compensates for the culturally normative immersion of the self in the Hindu group, 
an immersion the mother's emotional absence ostensibly facilitates. The love or hatred 
of the absent Hindu deity betrays in this way a certain love of self. Alternatively, the 
correspondence interpretation suggests that viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti 
correspond with the inner world of the Hindu child as he or she negotiates the 
relationship with the physically present, yet emotionally absent mother. Despairing love 
for and then angered abandonment of the absent deity corresponds precisely with the 
documented tactics children employ when forced to deal with the absent caregiver 
(Bowlby 1973). 
The discussion unfolds over three sections. I first present a brief review of two 
psychological theories I find most pertinent to the present project, attachment theory 
and object relations theory. I choose these two among the many because they have 
been the privileged theories for previous psychological studies of Hindu mergers and 
integrations (Maduro 1976; Kakar 1981).1 As separation and individuation are 
antithetical to merger and integration, a certain consistency in theoretical approach 
commends itself. I proceed from there to an admittedly brief discussion of Hindu god 
imagery. My intention is not, to be sure, to engage in a detailed analysis of any one 
particular image. I am not interested in the minutiae of particular images; studies of such 
minutiae abound. My intention is rather to identify the structural condition of particular 
Hindu god images that most reflect the ideal-type relationships between self and other 
that the theories address. Universal patterns of relationship inform the Hindu 
constructions of deity, constructions that reflect upon the relationship between devotee 
and deity and, by direct extension, self and other. The final section applies object 
relations theory and attachment theory to the Hindu god imagery.2 In so doing, the 
discussion necessitates a consideration of the contested topic of Hindu childrearing 
practices. The present project thus follows Kurtz's methodology: "By juxtaposing child-
rearing practices with myth and ritual, a picture of the inner meaning of development 
can be built up" (1992: 178). Indeed, the application of object relations theory and 
attachment theory to Hindu myths and childrearing ethnographies yields tentative 
answers to the question I pursue here: What is the psychology of the Hindu deus 
absconditusl 
 
Theory: Attachment and Object Relations  
Attachment theory addresses primarily human infant ethology. Based on the work of the 
British psychiatrist John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), attachment theory documents the 
proximity seeking strategies of the human infant. Human infants - and adults - 
consistently and predictably seek out proximity to a stronger, wiser other - the 
attachment figure - in moments of threat, distress, or fear of abandonment. Humans are, 
biologically speaking, irreducibly gregarious. Gregariousness has its risks. The 
attachment figure, for whatever reasons, may not be available. Relation- 
ship may be denied. Accordingly, the human animal has an evolved suite of behaviors 
to draw upon that help negotiate the vicissitudes of relationship (Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters, and Wall 1 978).  
Though some wish to disaggregate attachment theory from object relations theory 
(Granqvist 2006), others find that the two complement one another (Fonagy 1999, 
2001). I tend toward the latter position. As an etho logical perspective, attachment 
theory necessarily studies observable behaviors (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989). The human 
animal, however, enjoys an additional dimension - the inner world. Humans not only 
behave, they also have thoughts and fantasies concerning their behaviors (Greenberg 
and Mitchell 1983: 186-87). Because of the biological predisposition to gregariousness, 
one of the more predominant issues animating human fantasy is sociality. Accordingly, 
concerns pertaining to relationships often dominate the inner world. The fantasies and 
affects attending such concerns are the domain of object relations theory. Object 
relations theory proposes that the sense of self and other - that is, the self-
representation and the object representation - are co-constitutive (Greenberg and 
Mitchell 1983). True selfhood is thoroughly relational. Amid the various "objects" an 
individual encounters throughout the lifespan, one object in particular takes on an 
unequalled importance: the primary caregiver or attachment figure. On this score, 
attachment theory and object relations theory are clearly in agreement. 
The primary caregiver is that first other in the "basic biological situation," that is, "the 
period during which the child and the parent are locked in elemental care- giving, care-
receiving interactions" (Faber 2004: 17; see also Bollas 1987). According to both 
theories, the image of that first other, an image including not only the physical traits, but 
more importantly the affective nature of the relationship itself - what attachment theory 
calls the internal working model and what object relations theory calls the object 
representation - continues to influence the individual's perceptions, expectations, and 
affections regarding others throughout life. Due to the indelible effects of that first 
relationship, an individual never truly encounters a stranger again. We help create the 
objects we meet - including god, of course (Winnicott 1971). Significantly for the present 
discussion, the cognitive ability to distinguish an object as different from self develops 
over time. 
According to the child psychiatrist Margaret S. Mahler and her colleagues Fred Pine and 
Anni Bergman (2000: 44), the human infant begins its psychological life without the 
capacity to distinguish between self and object: an initial psychological monism or 
autism characterizes the neonate's inner world (see also Kakar 1981: 52- 53). Following 
upon this initial autism, the infant apparently enjoys a symbiotic phase. During this 
period, the infant sees all others - and especially the mother - as extensions of self. Self 
and mother are locked in a symbiotic embrace. According to Mahler, the psychological 
birth of the human infant - a birth not coincident in time with the physical birth - rests 
precisely on a rupturing of this symbiosis. The self- representation depends upon an 
initial negation of a totality, a negation catalyzing the protracted process of what Mahler 
famously calls "separation-individuation.” 
Mature psychological health, according to Mahler, Pine, and Bergman results from an 
uncompromised break with the (m)other. 
The developmental psychologist Daniel N. Stern raises some doubt regarding the 
primacy of Mahler's symbiosis. He suggests that merger experiences are dependent on 
an already established sense of self: "The evidence... suggests that the capacity to 
have merger-or fusion-like experiences as described in psychoanalysis is secondary to 
and dependent upon an already existing sense of self and other" (Stern 1985: 70; see 
also Rochat 2001). Prior to the emergence of what he calls the "core self," and in 
advance of any Mahlerian symbiotic experiences, Stern argues that there is an 
"emergent self," that is, "the infant can experience the process of emerging organization 
as well as the result" (1985: 45; emphasis added). The emergent self apparently 
predates all other psychological experiences, including the symbiotic one. For Stern, 
Mahler's symbiotic moment is the result of the emergent or core self-collapsing the 
boundary between itself and the other. Stern thus challenges the developmental 
schema Mahler proposes, but he does not deny - and this is most important for the 
present discussion - the capacity for symbiosis and merger. 
This is in fact Fred Pine's (2000: ix) reply to Stern. Pine argues that there are indeed 
moments when nondifferentiation from the mother constitutes the infant's experience. 
Though the experience of fusion/symbiosis/merger may not find support in 
developmental psychology as a primary experience, it is all the same recognized as a 
potential and deeply influential occurrence in the inner world of the infant. The critical 
question thus concerns the extent to which these brief merger experiences, which 
object relations theory, attachment theory, and developmental psychology 
acknowledge, affect adult fantasy. Pine asserts that they affect it greatly: 
Are such experiences, if brief, sufficient to account for the significance of merger 
wishes or merger anxieties in later life? To this I answer with a clear "yes "...The 
lasting significance of developmental events need in no way be highly correlated 
with their duration: intense affective states - be they deeply satisfying and reliable, or 
traumatic and intrusive or prematurely ruptured - may well have an impact on 
memory, wish, fantasy formation, and anxiety far out of proportion to their simple 
duration .... 
The sense of merger is in fact consistent with the reality of the infant's experience at 
times, so there is no reason to think that the more objectively accurate perceptions 
will automatically transcend them. This does not occur uniformly even in adults, in 
whom self-other differentiation may be thought to be much more securely 
established (2000: ix-x; emphasis added). 
Stern's work is persuasive, Pine's response compelling. We need not presume a 
developmental stage of primary symbiosis to maintain the presence of symbiotic 
moments and their impact on the fantasy lives of children and adults. What I find most 
significant for the present discussion is Pine's recognition of both "merger wishes" and 
"merger anxieties." Infant as well as adult fantasy life has the capacity not only to long 
for, but also to flee from merger experiences. Such fantasies clearly inform the 
structural dimensions of god imagery. 
From the perspective of object relations theory and attachment theory, idiosyncratic 
fantasy, familial relationships, and extended culture influence the construction of any 
one god image. The god image is in this regard what the object relations tradition calls a 
transitional object (Winnicott 1971; Rizzuto 1979). The psychologist of religion William 
B. Parsons explains: 
The God-Representation is a representational collage, a "work of art" over 
determined on a variety of levels, being constructed from extant cultural materials, 
the full spectrum of developmental phases and abstract ideational components. 
Culture mediates the components of religion through family, church, and school. 
Clinical studies show that the God-Representation can be composed of paternal and 
maternal elements and reflect pre-Oedipal as well as Oedipal developmental 
configurations (1999: 157). 
If the sense of self is intimately tied to the representation of the other, then god, as the 
nonobvious object par excellence, is the infinitely malleable object capable not only of 
reflecting but also informing and responding to the self s developmental needs. To be 
sure, "the sense of self and its reality is directly and vitally connected with the God 
representation.... The elaboration and reworking (or lack of reworking) of the parental 
imagos into a God representation... is... deeply related to the endless process of 
separation-individuation from the parents, and also to newer identifications with them" 
(Rizzuto 1979: 51). 
Despite the rather widespread consensus amid the object relations community 
concerning the universality of separation-individuation, anthropologists working with 
Indian material present confounding data. Kurtz (1992) and Suzanne R. Kirschner 
(1996) argue in particular that Mahler's theory of separation-individuation is culturally 
determined. According to Kurtz and Kirschner, Hindu India does not privilege or 
promote individuation. Hindu India promotes "separation-integration" (Kurtz 1992: 273). 
While separation from the primary caregiver is a universal element in human 
psychological development, culture apparently dictates the normative outcome of such 
separation. Where modern Western culture emphasizes individuation, Hindu India 
presses integration (a process perhaps equally applicable to Japanese culture [see 
Roland 1988]). Thus, the psychoanalyst of religion Ana- Maria Rizzuto' s emphasis on 
separation-individuation in relation to the Hindu god representation requires 
emendation. The Hindu god representation is deeply related to the process of 
separation-integration, or so we would be led to believe. The seductive simplicity of 
such dichotomous thinking notwithstanding, Hindu god images are, I argue, illusory 
transitional objects, deeply related to either separation- integration or separation-
individuation (Nagpal 2003; Ramanujan 1999; Obeyese- kere 1981; Kakar 1989). 
Description: Hindu God Images  
The impression one often gets, especially today, is that Hinduism is an essentially 
monistic tradition (King 1999). The Advaita Vedanta, in particular, is often privileged as 
the prototypical Hindu religious worldview. The cross-cultural psycho-analyst Alan 
Roland suggests that without an appreciation of the centrality of the Advaita Vedanta, "it 
is virtually impossible to comprehend Indian psychological makeup, society, and culture" 
(1988: 289). While monistic interests are clearly prevalent in Hindu India, Roland 
overstates the case. Moreover and rarely com- mented upon, the Advaita Vedanta is 
not all of a psychological piece. In this regard, Roland seemingly misidentifies disparate 
psychologies. Because there are two types of "oceanic feeling" (Masson 1980; Parsons 
1999), I argue there are two competing psychologies. Roland's observation regarding 
the centrality of the Advaita Vedanta is significantly incomplete. For instance, where the 
nineteenth-century Bengali saint Ramakrsna and the Chandogya Upanisadic student-
hero Svetaketu apparently immerse themselves in the other's totality, the subject of the 
Astdvakrasamhita subsumes all others in itself.3 Oceanic totality represents either the 
other's grandiosity or the self s grandiosity. Identifying which of the two is most 
prevalent in Hindu India - something I believe Roland fails to do - would greatly mitigate, 
among other things, the routine assignation of pathology to unitive mysticism, a topic to 
which we shall return. For now, and despite the popularity of monistic god imagery, the 
Hindu tradition(s) clearly makes room for god imagery that is anything but monistic 
(O'Flaherty 1980: 87-88; Milner 1994: 208). There are indeed models of bhakti which 
unequivocally contest the merger fantasy. Viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti are two such 
models. 
Viraha bhakti is love-in-separation. The virahini, or viraha bhakta, pines for the god to 
return to presence. The god, however, intentionally withdraws from the devotee. In the 
Bhdgavata Purdna (10.32.20-21), for instance, Krsna withdraws for the sake of his 
devotees' intense devotion: "I do not love even the people who love me, so that their 
attachment may continue...! have concealed myself... for the sake of your devotion to 
me" (Hardy 1983: 536). The devotees themselves question whether Krsna will ever 
return: "Will he ever place his arm... upon our heads?" (Bhdgavata Purdna 10.47.21; 
Bryant 2003: 197). The heartfelt longings for unity with Krsna at the center of viraha 
bhakti notwithstanding, these passages present a god image in direct contrast to that of 
the oceanic feeling. Here the deity is nowhere to be found. He has withdrawn, and the 
community of devotees bemoans his withdrawal. In certain devotional moments, the 
devotee even claims the fires of separation will consume her being (Hawley 1984: 105). 
While one should not casually dismiss such protestations, I propose that it is the 
absence of the deity's presence that ought to capture our attention. Krsna' s messenger 
Uddhava seemingly confirms this when he addresses the gopis: "By your separation, 
you have shown wholehearted love for Adhoksaja" (Bhdgavata Purdna 10.47.27; Bryant 
2003: 198). In a similar vein, the historian of Hindu religions Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty 
incorporates a passage from E. M. Forster's A Passage to India to illustrate viraha 
bhakti: "The god is a deus absconditus or otiosus. As Professor Godbole explains to 
Mrs. Moore, the worshipper imagines that he is a gopi who sings to Krishna, 'Come to 
me,' but the god refuses to come.... He may come in 'some other song' but not in our 
song, not now' " (1980: 122; emphasis in original). This is important. In certain 
instances, the god returns to the devotee. However, for some devotees the god is not 
coming back, not in this song, not now - perhaps never. I argue that it is precisely this 
structural separation that constitutes viraha bhakti. 
If longing-in-separation characterizes viraha bhakti, virodha bhakti presents a similar 
structural separation but one marked this time not by love but by enmity. Virodha bhakti 
refers to those forms of devotion wherein the devotee expresses disaffection for the 
god. The Tamil poet Cuntaramurttinayanar provides some telling verses: "I don't call to 
him as my mother. I don't call to him as my father. I thought it would be enough to call 
him my lord - but he pretends I don't exist, doesn't show an ounce of mercy. ...Can't we 
find some other god?" (1 Patikam 4.2; O'Flaherty 1988: 170). Here the poet represents 
the god not only as withdrawn, but more importantly as unresponsive. Elsewhere he 
bitterly notes: "You can sell me off, but I am nobody's pawn - I chose to be mastered by 
you! I did nothing wrong, yet you blinded me - why, lord, did you take my eye? The 
disgrace is wholly yours. If you won't restore my other eye - then I wish you luck; go 
away!" (4 Patikam 95.2; O'Flaherty 1988: 176; emphasis in original). Once again 
expressing displeasure, Cuntaramurttinayanar finally dismisses the god altogether. 
Even within the Bhdgavata Purdna (10.47.16-17), similar dissatisfactions with the deity 
find expression: "The fickle Krsna abandoned those who had abandoned children, 
husbands and other people in this world for his sake. Why then should I be recon- ciled 
with him? His disposition is cruel.... Enough of friendship with that dark- complexioned 
one" (Bryant 2003: 197).  
There is no question concerning the disparate affective states viraha bhakti and virodha 
bhakti represent. The former bemoans the withdrawal of the god while the latter angrily 
encourages it. Such affective disparity notwithstanding, I invite us to consider that the 
two devotional models conjointly oppose Hinduism's monistic images in their explicit 
representation of an existent yet absent god. Because the psychological tradition of 
commentary upon Hinduism is replete with considerations of unitive states, it is this 
structural separation of deity and devotee that ought now to command our attention. I 
propose that the devotee who bemoans the withdrawal of or angrily dismisses Krsna (or 
&iva as the case may be) is for whatever reasons motivated to represent Krsna as 
withdrawn or worthy of dismissal in the first place. What, psychologically, explains the 
construction of the Hindu deus absconditus? 
Redescription: Toward a Psychology of the Hindu Deus Absconditus  
Sudhir Kakar argues that the vicissitudes of fusion and separation constitute the "the 
essential psychological theme of Hindu culture" (1981: 34). As essential, this 
psychological theme necessarily pervades the disparities between Hindu unitive 
mysticism and Hindu devotional separation. Proposing that Hindu India generally 
privileges fusions and mergers (Kakar 1981; see also Roland 1988, 1996), Kakar notes 
that in clinical practice his Indian patients often suffer from fears of separation from 
attachment figures, explicitly suggesting that the threat of loneliness is most troubling 
(1981: 85). For many, such fears and anxieties appear to encourage the pursuit of 
mystical experiences. Herein resides the infamous assignation of psycho- pathology. 
The unitive experience is a pathological retreat to the infantile scene. 
In Samadhi, the saint has by the progressive annihilation of all external and internal 
distracting stimuli, achieved the feat of voluntary regression to the prenatal state 
before his first encounter with the outside world. He is lowered into a pit, the womb 
of earth, and once enclosed there he lives forever unchanging in a timeless bliss of 
union with his creator: a triumph of phantasy over the reality-scene (Carstairs 1961: 
161). 
Kakar adds,  
The vicissitudes of separation have been... at the heart of psychoanalytic theorizing 
on mysticism. The yearning to be reunited with a perfect, omnipotent being, the 
longing for the blissful soothing and nursing associated with the mother of earliest 
infancy (perhaps as much an adult myth as an infantile reality), has been 
consensually deemed the core of mystical motivation (1991 : 24-25). 
While such a position may reflect the heart of psychoanalytic theorizing on mysticism, 
we must not lose sight of the fact that such psychoanalytic theorizing may be overly 
influenced by cultural preferences. Perhaps Western mysticism reflects a certain return 
to the blissful soothing of earliest infancy, but this may not be the case for Hindu India. 
A potentially flawed interpretation of Hindu childrearing practices produces a 
misidentified ontogenesis of Hindu moksa, a misidentification facilitating an erroneous 
imputation of pathology to all forms of mysticism. 
G. Morris Carstairs (1961) provides one of the first psychological accounts of 
childrearing practices in Hindu India. He generally portrays the Hindu mother as overly 
indulgent with her child, a thesis supported by both Philip Spratt (1966) and Kakar 
(1981). According to Carstairs, Spratt, and Kakar, the Hindu mother shelters her child 
from day-to-day frustrations, the very sort of frustrations object relations theorists posit 
to be of inimitable value to the separation-individuation process. Indeed, the repeated 
experience of minor frustrations is precisely what facilitates the gradual and ostensibly 
normative separation from the mother. In the absence of such a gradual introduction to 
frustration, the Hindu child continues to live in an almost magical world of immediate 
emotional and physical gratifications.  
The main emphasis in the early years of childhood is avoidance of frustration.... An 
Indian child is encouraged to continue to live in a mythical, magical world for a long 
time. In this world, objects, events and other persons do not have an existence of 
their own, but are intimately related to the self and its mysterious moods... a state of 
being in which the whole world, including other people, is experienced as a part of 
the self and within one's spontaneous control (Kakar 1981: 103,105,128). 
The developmental problem associated with such prolonged indulgence is that it ill 
equips the child for the eventual separation from the mother, a separation that then 
amounts to "a narcissistic injury of the first magnitude" (Kakar 1981 : 128). 
Classical psychoanalytic accounts of Hindu personality development suggest that with 
the introduction of the adult world of societal proscription and law, an introduction 
classically accompanying the Hindu rite of initiation for the boy (for example, the 
upanayana) and marriage for the girl, the child is abruptly taken from the world of 
indulgent mothers and placed in the world of cool, dharmic regulations. The child is 
ostensibly torn from symbiotic bliss and thrown into a world of fastidious distinctions and 
separations. Carstairs, Spratt, and Kakar argue that this unprepared for, abrupt 
separation from the mother ends in an infantile identification with her, a passive stance 
in regard to others who are expected to treat the subject as he or she was treated in 
childhood. It is for these reasons that the Hindu childrearing pattern nurtures a 
narcissistic personality, that is, a personality prone to see external reality as an 
extension of self (Spratt 1966). All three authors thus identify as pathological a general 
Hindu failure to separate, a failure based on maternally indulgent child- rearing 
practices. Consequently, moksa must reflect this pathology, or such is the substance of 
Kurtz's (1992) criticism of the classical account of both Hindu mysticism and Hindu 
childrearing practices. 
The current debate regarding Hindu childrearing practices concerns the nature of Hindu 
maternal indulgence. Ethnographic data documenting breastfeeding through the first 
three or four years of life in combination with observations of the mother sleeping next 
to her children through the first several years of life attest to a certain physical 
indulgence. According to the classical account, emotional indulgence attends this 
physical indulgence (Kakar 1981: 54-55). The Hindu mother complements her physical 
ministrations with emotional investment. Kurtz, following Alan R. Beals (1962), Leigh 
Minturn and John T. Hitchcock (1966), Geoffrey Gorer (1967), Renaldo Maduro (1976), 
and Margaret Trawick (1990), and further corrobo- rated by Susan C. Seymour (1999) 
and Alan Roland (1994), contests precisely this claim. Kurtz suggests that the Hindu 
mother is physically present but emotionally absent. Such dynamics constitute the "new 
psychology of Hinduism" (Kurtz 1992: 6). 
Kurtz, and others, argue that the ethnographic data do not support the love relationship 
between mother and child characteristic of Kakar' s interpretation of Hindu childrearing 
practices. While there seems to be an indulgence with respect to physical ministrations, 
the emotional complement is apparently missing. It is precisely the absence of 
emotional indulgence that forestalls the narcissism the classical authors putatively 
detect: "The difficulty with this idea of pervasive narcissism in Hindu family life... is that 
neither the mother nor the other family members are engaged in an intimate exchange 
or reflection of emotions with the child" (Kurtz 1992: 41). Minturn observes in fact that 
the Hindu mother's interaction with her child would seem to be anything but emotional 
stimulation: "Adult interaction with babies is generally aimed at producing a cessation of 
response rather than a stimulation of it" (1966: 1 10; emphasis added). Such practices 
are not, to be sure, exclusive to Hindu India. The anthropologist Robert A. LeVine notes 
that many non- Western cultures similarly engage in physical indulgence and emotional 
withdrawal when tending their young. He observes that behaviors such as empathic eye 
contact and smile elicitation do not factor into these various cultures and their 
childrearing practices (LeVine 1977: 23). 
The point for Kurtz is that the Hindu mother - through such emotional withdrawal - 
intentionally prepares her child for the inevitable separation from her and the 
subsequent integration in the group, the overlooked player in the Hindu child's inner 
world. He in fact goes to great lengths to suggest that the mother "gently" pushes her 
child toward the group of in-law mothers: 
The family group, and not merely the individual mother and her child, lies at the core of 
this suggested model of Hindu child rearing. From this point of view, much of a Hindu 
mother's behavior toward her child is designed to gently push him away from the 
relationship with her and toward a sense of immersion in, or unity with, the family at 
large. Similarly, the behavior of family members other than the mother is meant to exert 
a kind of pull on the child to drive him away from an exclusive tie to the mother (Kurtz 
1992: 60-61). 
Seymour similarly notes, "While nursing, a mother responds physically to her child but 
withholds empathic attention, thus encouraging the child to seek emotional satisfaction 
in relationships with others, not in an exclusive relationship with her" (1999: 82). 
According to Kurtz and Seymour, the preoedipal, emotional separations the child 
experiences at the hands of the mother prepare him for the forthcoming ritual 
separations, thereby reducing the tension and anxiety of Kakar's upanayana while 
simultaneously nurturing the expectation of rewards attendant upon inclusion in the 
adult group. 
Conceding for the present the new psychology of Hinduism, the question concern- ing 
the child's perception of the Hindu mother's partial indulgence immediately arises. To 
suggest that the child understands the reasoning behind the mother's behavior would 
certainly attribute too much cognitive maturity - not to mention emotional detachment - 
to the child. In the absence of such emotional detachment and cognitive maturity, the 
possibility of affective hurt must be entertained, or at least such is the Indian psychiatrist 
Salman Akhtar's criticism of Kurtz's work. Akhtar notes that a child who experiences the 
mother's emotional absence must suffer: "In proposing that the unempathic and 
'impersonal character' of maternal care propels the child toward 'mature immersion' in 
the larger family group, Kurtz betrays an astonishing lack of understanding of how 
traumatic such mothering can be for the child" (1997: 1017). Kurtz has not, according to 
Akhtar, resolved the issue of painful separation from the mother by insisting on her 
"gentle push" toward the group prior to the upanayana (or other such ritual separations). 
In fact, even Kurtz acknowledges the priority of this injury: "While the child no doubt 
develops a strong emotional attachment to the mother as a result of the physical 
gratification she provides, the mother does not respond by setting up a Western-style 
loving, emotional partnership" (1992: 44). Moreover, and despite Kurtz's suggestion that 
the group of in-law mothers lessens the hurt felt by the child, the preeminent attachment 
theorist John Bowlby (1969, 1973) argues to the exact contrary that polymatry actually 
intensifies monotropy; that is, a group of mothers serves to intensify and not mitigate the 
child's desire for attachment to the primary caregiver. It would thus seem that at least a 
significant aspect of the Hindu child's preoedipal world rests with an unrequited longing 
for emotional reciprocity, a longing so strong that it potentially amounts to a longing for 
unity. 
The classical psychological interpretation of moksa is that it is a return to the symbiotic 
embrace of childhood. Moksa ostensibly corresponds with the blissful state of union with 
the mother, in this way undoing the process of separation- individuation. Kakar writes, 
"The theme of isolation and its transcendence... constitutes the core of the moksha 
ideal. This theme has its ontogenetic source in... the interactions between mothers and 
infants in Indian society... elaborated in Hindu mythology as the persistent nostalgic 
wish for the benevolent presence of the 'good mother' as she was experienced in 
infancy" (1981: 85). Elsewhere, he qualifies this emphasis on infancy when interpreting 
Ramakrsna's mysticism: "The mother was unavailable at a time when his anxiety about 
separation, and its convergent depression, were at their apex.... The unity Ramakrishna 
aimed for is, then, not the mergerlike states of the infant at the breast... but the ending 
of separation striven for by the toddler" (Kakar 1991: 26-27; emphasis added). Though 
Kakar addresses disparate psychosocial stages in these two passages, all the same he 
maintains a commitment to a correspondence interpretation: moksa corresponds with 
an early childhood reality, either symbiotic or preseparation. In both instances, the 
repetition of the childhood scene is understood to be a retreat from an adult reality, in 
which case a subtle intimation of psychopathology lingers. Kurtz, to the contrary, 
proposes that the moksa experience is a "spiritualized" version of the individual's 
culturally normative integration in the group. In other words, moksa corresponds not 
with the infantile reality of the young Hindu child, but with the mature immersion of the 
older child in the extended family: 'The solution, exemplified by the ecstatic's merger 
with the collective gods, is voluntary renunciation of infantile connection in favor of a 
merger with the group" (Kurtz 1992: 186). By virtue of this interpretation, Kurtz contests 
the assignation of pathology to unitive mysticism precisely because such a position 
disregards the culturally relative normalcy of the mature group sense of self. Despite 
their disparate interpretations, both Kakar and Kurtz remain in this way wedded to a 
correspondence interpretation, altogether overlooking the possibility that moksa may 
just as easily provide psychological compensation. 
The compensatory interpretation suggests that the monistic god image compensates for 
the shortcomings of early childhood. Accordingly, Advaita Vedanta's moksa conceivably 
reflects the compensatory efforts of the devotees to surmount the dynamics of Hindu 
childhood. The prevalence of merged identities of the type where the self loses itself in 
the other may rest in the Hindu mother's emotional unavailability. In other words, those 
longing for a submersion of self in other may betray a psychological discomfort with the 
realities of Hindu childrearing practices. Such is the substance of the work of the 
Indologist and psychoanalyst J. Moussaieff Masson (1976), who suggests that an 
abandonment depression often informs monistic mysticism. He argues that many of the 
themes found in Hindu religious and philosophical literature reflect depressive states: 
"The concern voiced ubiquitously by the ascetic in Indian literature - vairagya or nirveda, 
'world weariness' or 'disgust' - is an oblique reference to the affective disorder known as 
sadness when mild, depression when strong, and melancholia when severe" (Masson 
1976: 618). Masson provocatively suggests elsewhere that all ascetics "have suffered 
from harsh and unloving parents" (1976: 623; see also Deutsch 1975). Combining this 
statement with one from The Oceanic Feeling (Masson 1980), the potential outlines of 
the affective impact of Hindu childrearing practices upon the child emerge: "Behind 
every depression is a memory of being alone, of being left" (71). This would partially 
account for Kakar' s repeated encounter with analysands anxious about separation. A 
certain pathological reaction to the absence of maternal empathy may drive the search 
for mystical integration with the other. Of course, such an interpretation would leave out 
of consideration the moksa experience reflected in the Astdvakrasamhita, that is, the 
mystical experience wherein the self subsumes the other. 
According to the anthropologist Ronald Preston Rohner (1975), "rejecting parent- ing 
styles," including specifically those forms of routine, physical ministrations accompanied 
by empathic absence here associated explicitly with Hindu India, often eventuate in a 
worldview where the external reality is seen as deceptive and wrong. Here of course 
Advaita Vedanta's doctrine of maya comes immediately to mind. 
The underlying mistrust which seems to cloud so many of my informants' adult 
personal relationships may well be derived from the phantasy of a fickle mother who 
mysteriously withholds her caresses and attentions from time to time... at weaning 
the child's emotional insecurity is suddenly intensified.... His confidence is shattered 
and from now on he mistrusts everything that pretends to constancy.... To such a 
feeling the concept of all-pervading Maya seems appropriate, if not inevitable 
(Carstairs 1961: 158). 
Juxtaposing the recent discussions of Hindu childrearing practices with the Advaita 
Vedanta's devaluation of the untrustworthy world and its monistic longings, the 
possibility arises that the Hindu child and/or mystic suffers from an abandonment 
depression and seeks to mollify the affects of such depression by engaging in a fantasy 
regarding the grandiose self. If the childrearing practices in Hindu India explicitly 
proscribe the mother's empathic gaze, then Rizzuto's comment becomes particularly 
apt: "Bewilderment, narcissistic rage, vengeful grandiose wishes (hidden in fantasy or 
enacted in adaptive or maladaptive behavior), and identification with God are the 
common adaptational reactions to make the painful state of not being mirrored as 
oneself tolerable" (1979: 186). To be sure, aggression against others often attends 
cosmic narcissism (Masson 1980). Significantly, this is precisely how Kakar reads Saiva 
god imagery: 
[The] earliest reparation in which the boy turns away from the disappointing external 
world and seeks comfort and a sense of control in such defensive manoeuvres (sic) 
as 'I do not need anyone,' 'I am sufficient unto myself,' and 'I am perfect.' This 
compensatory activation of the grandiose self finds its mythological counterpart in 
the very conception of Shiva - remote from the world, isolated and self-sufficient in 
his mountain hideout of Kailasha (1981: 156; emphasis added). 
Narcissistic grandiosity forestalls future harm issuing from the abandoning object(s) by 
ultimately denying that object's reality 
As seen here, the two types of monistic Hindu god imagery reflect disparate 
psychological tactics. The first type - submersion of self in other - is seemingly 
overdetermined. As Kurtz argues, this type may correspond with a psychologically 
healthy immersion of self in the adult group, in which case there is nothing pathological 
here. By contrast and again allowing Kurtz's model to inform us, the same submersion 
of self in other may reflect a compensatory longing for what was not in fact the case, in 
which case there may be a tinge of psychopathology. After all, Kurtz's reading of 
monistic mysticism depends upon immersion in a collectivity of gods, and often the 
monistic experience is characterized not by unity with a collection but rather an 
individual deity, for example, Ramakrsna's immersion in Ma Kali. The second form of 
monistic god imagery presents, on the other hand, a god image in which the self takes 
on grandiose proportions. There is an explicit sense that nothing else exists but the self. 
Interestingly, and unlike the first form of monism, the second does not seem to lend 
itself to the correspondence model. Rather, the grandiose self lends itself to two 
compensatory interpretations. For instance, if the psychological developmental norm is 
to immerse oneself in the group, then this would clearly betray a certain 
psychopathology. Like Kakar's Siva, the individual denies the very reality of the 
frustrating, preoedipal object. Even more significantly from the Kurtzian perspective, the 
group is denied existence. While this is to a certain extent a compelling interpretation, 
there is another. Complementing the potential pathology implied by the first 
compensatory interpretation, the second suggests a psychologically healthy alternative. 
Roland suggests that devotional practices are meant to extricate the individual from 
immersion in the larger family. Though the normative developmental outcome reflects a 
tie to the larger group - what Roland calls the "familial self (1988) - there are moments 
when individual Hindus seek to escape the group. 
What has been profoundly overlooked is that however much these religious modes 
of worship and experience are related to the intense mother-child symbiotic 
relationship, the actual religious experience enables the person to become 
increasingly individuated, differentiated, and separated from the intensely emotional, 
familial involvements. This experience thus becomes an essential counterpoint to 
the familial self (Roland 1988: 296; emphasis added). 
Elsewhere Roland notes, "There is... considerable privacy and often secrecy involved in 
individual spiritual practices, key ingredients in the separation process…I must posit it 
[that is, the effort to realize the spiritual self] as the central theme of Indian individuation 
throughout life" (Roland 1988: 309-310; emphasis added). According to Roland, the 
grandiose individuation associated with the second type of Hindu monism reflects the 
individual's desire to extricate himself from the web of family relationships. This is not 
psychopathological, but in fact quite salubrious. Roland however betrays an 
inconsistency. While he suggests that the spiritual practices are ways for the Hindu 
practitioner to disengage the extended family and this en route to a separated, 
individuated inner world, he undermines this reading by his larger account of bhakti. 
In bhakti devotional worship, various facets of symbiosis-reciprocity involved in 
hierarchical intimacy relationships become clearly accentuated. Intense emotional 
connectedness and reciprocal affective exchanges, a sense of we-ness, and 
permeable ego boundaries are all intensely involved in bhakti worship. The devotee 
seeks through intense emotionality to be merged with the god, goddess, or 
incarnation... and in turn through the merger expects the reciprocity of divine bliss 
(Roland 1988: 295). 
The trouble I have with Roland's observations is that they complement the problematic 
methodological individualism of classical psychoanalysis. If Freudians are seduced by 
the siren of individualism, it would appear that many authors working with non-Western 
material are similarly seduced by the siren of the group. Roland persistently pursues 
Hindu merger. Needless to say, this smacks as much of Orientalism as the assignation 
of pathology to the un-individuated Hindu. As Rizzuto so clearly argues, the world of 
religious fantasy is a world of objects. The question for psychologists of religion 
concerns the relationship of the self to this inner-object-world. According to Roland, the 
individuated Hindu is really not so. The Hindu may disengage the familial, but this 
apparently in the name of engaging the esoteric familial. The bhakta forgoes familial 
merger for divine merger. In which case, I am left asking, are there really no separated-
individuated individuals in Hindu India? Are merger anxieties pertinent only to the 
individualistic West? 
Moksa elicits, at least for some, a merger anxiety (Milner 1994: 223, 225). Despite the 
contemporary enthusiasm for Hinduism's monistic soteriologies, some Hindus desire a 
continued sense of self, a sense dependent upon an opposition to the other. Viraha 
bhakti and virodha bhakti are models ministering to such desires. The absent object is 
the object representation par excellence for a self-representation in which one's sense 
of self is eternally preserved from the identity-eliding experience found in Advaita 
Vedanta's god imagery. In this sense, Hinduism's theology of istadevata (chosen deity) 
provides the participant community the leeway necessary to accommodate their varying 
psychological needs (Rao 2005: 302). The panoply of Hindu god images and their 
devotional models provide the idiom in which Hindu devotees may locate their own 
senses of self, that is, a chosen devotional model becomes what Gananath 
Obeyesekere (1981) refers to as a personal symbol.4 Like their monistic complement, 
however, viraha bhakti and virodha bhakit are equally overdetermined. 
Viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti are complex forms of devotion lending them-selves 
both to compensatory and correspondence interpretations. One compensatory reading 
suggests that the images reflect the satisfaction of a deep wish. For example, viraha 
bhakti unquestionably protests a longing for the other to return. This protestation may 
even become so exaggerated as to suggest the utter annihilation of the one so 
separated. All the same, the passionate protestations of love for the absent Krsna and 
the desire for him to return may dissimulate the opposite wish which the god image 
actually fulfills. Krsna is present as absent. The psychological payoff is that the 
gopi/devotee knows he or she is not Krsna or better yet, that Krsna is "not-me." An 
absent Krsna safeguards the devotee's identity. Thus in the moments of dire devotion to 
the deity, that is viraha bhakti, the deep motivation may be narcissistic: a profound love 
of self-funds the profound love for the absent other. Viraha bhakti is, at least from this 
perspective, love (of self)-in-separation (from other), a heretofore undetected reversal of 
the object of love in bhakti. Rizzuto comments in regard to one of her analysands: "She 
wants no union with God: 'I don't know what it means to be united to God but I think it 
means I will have to be a part of him and I don't feel I want to be a part of him.' One may 
reflect whether this is a defensive reaction against fusion" (1979: 171-72). I propose we 
extend Rizzuto's reflection to viraha bhakti: viraha bhakti's god image potentially reflects 
a defensive reaction against fusion. Despite Roland's suggestion that through "bhakti 
devotional worship... the devotee seeks. ..to be merged with the god" (1988: 295), the 
exact opposite is occasionally the case, that is, the devotee seeks not merger but 
separation. Significantly, what keeps this form of narcissism from falling into 
psychopathology is that the other is not annihilated as it is in grandiose narcissism. The 
other maintains an existence in viraha bhakti, reflecting a healthy sense of self as 
opposed to other. 
Separation as a healthy, defensive maneuver is similarly accomplished by aggressive 
means. While viraha bhakti is pervaded by the sentiment, "I love you," virodha bhakti 
presents the sentiment, "I hate you." Cuntaramurttinayanar is particularly prevalent 
here. Again, from an object relations perspective, Cuntaramurttinayanar's sense of 
betrayal and concomitant anger may in fact be the fulfillment of a wish. Unrequited love 
and outraged antagonism are both psychical mechanisms for maintaining a distance 
between self and other (Bollas 1987; Balint 1953). Note the psychotherapist James F. 
Masterson's interpretation of one of his analysand's behavior: "When the wish for union 
and merger became too intense, he would attack the idealized person because only by 
attack could he separate and preserve his sense of self (1988: 215). Similar dynamics 
may inform virodha bhakti. The self-representation that favors an individuated identity 
has at its disposal an object representation worthy of attack. Kakar's clinical work with 
Pran supports such an interpretation: 
Relatively early in his analysis, Pran became aware of the underlying pattern in his 
behavior. Going to work, traveling, drinking and, of course, sexual intercourse, are 
'manly' activities to which he is greatly drawn. They are, however, also experienced 
as a separation from the mother which gives rise to anxiety till he must come back to 
her, in food and sleep. He must recurrently merge with her in order, as he puts it, to 
strengthen his nervous system.... It took a longer time for Pran to become aware of 
the terror of his mother's overwhelming invasiveness inspired in the little boy and his 
helpless rage in dealing with it.... He realized that all his 'manly' activities were not 
only in pursuit of individuation as a man... but also because they would lacerate the 
mother.... Often, as he lies there, abusing the mother, with a blissful expression on 
his face reflecting her close presence, I cannot help but feel that this is nindastuti 
[a.k.a., virodha bhakti] worship of a divinity through insult, denigration and contempt, 
which is one of the recognized relationships of a Hindu devotee with a divinity (1999: 
226-27). 
Virodha bhakti is according to this compensatory interpretation a form of object 
representation in the service of preserving an individuated sense of self in the face of a 
potentially encompassing object: aggression constructs an externality that aids the 
individuation of self (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983: 355). " 'I am' demands space, often 
in confrontation with the 'I am' of others" (Nagpal 2003: 65). The object representation, 
and in this case, the god image worthy of abuse, plays this role. Like viraha bhakti, 
virodha bhakti is conceivably a compensatory, narcissistic defense against merger 
anxieties. 
While the compensatory interpretations suggest themselves, it is equally plausible that 
viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti correspond. Bhaktas may represent through religious 
literature and poetry the emotional dynamics of an unresponsive caregiver in early 
childhood. Viraha bhakti may be seen in this way as the first step toward virodha bhakti. 
If Indian children must negotiate an identity in the face of an empathically absent 
mother, then perhaps viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti reflect first the child's longing for 
the other and secondly the child's anger toward the other so withdrawn. According to 
attachment theory, this is in fact the two-step process towards abandoning the 
unavailable other (Bowlby 1973, 1980). At first, the child pines for the caregiver's 
attention. Absence does indeed make the heart grow fonder, at first. Recall, Krsna 
withdraws in order for the devotees' devotion to grow (Hardy 1983: 536). Despite Kurtz's 
position, this accurately reflects the dynamics of attachment. An unavailable other 
intensifies, not mitigates the self's desires. If emotional reciprocity is not forthcoming, 
the child despairs. In direct contrast to Kurtz's model, which suggests that the self 
abandons the primary other for the secondary others, we notice that the gopis are 
forlorn for they have abandoned the secondary others for attachment to the other, who 
in turn abandons them. The gopi/child at first foregoes relationships to the extended 
family members in order to love only the mother. Of course, from Uddhava's 
perspective, the gopis show love for Krsna by their separation. Uddhava's position is 
much more in line with Kurtz's suggestion, that is, the child - from the mother's 
perspective to be sure - demonstrates his or her love for the withdrawn mother precisely 
by allowing the separation. Of course, like the child, the gopis do not seem convinced of 
Uddhava's message. 
Recalling now Cuntaramurttinayanar's virodha bhakti, we find some similarly interesting 
suggestions. Cuntaramurttinayanar proclaims that he did nothing wrong, yet the god 
blinded him all the same. Blinding is a classical psychoanalytic euphemism for 
castration. If we put this through the Kurtzian mill, we find that the god/ mother blinds 
the child, that is, severs the child's libidinal ties to her, and this without the child having 
had the opportunity to develop such ties in a transgressive way - Cuntaramurttinayanar 
did nothing wrong. Perhaps most telling, however, is that both the gopis and 
Cuntaramurttinayanar eventually get to the point where they say "enough." After all, the 
gopis first bemoan Krsna' s withdrawal and then eventually suggest his abandonment. 
As attachment theory predicts, the child/devotee finally abandons the unresponsive 
other. In both instances, the devotee wishes to find some other god/parent. This is 
precisely Kurtz's point. By her emotional unavailability, the mother forestalls the 
development of the libidinal ties the child so desires and in so doing forces the child to 
choose a substitute object. Both the gopis and Cuntaramurttinayanar eventually call for 
the same abandonment of the deus absconditus and otiosus. Perhaps in these 
instances, the god image corresponds with the poets' own parent(s) who in childhood 
"neglected" their emotional pleas in favor of group orientation. While this accurately 
reflects Kurtz's model, where it departs is in the clear indication of hurt and despair first 
felt by the child/devotee before he or she moves on to another: Kurtz is too ready to 
discount anguish and despair. 
As a last option - though one I do not find particularly compelling - perhaps the bhakti 
literature betrays the child's revenge. John Stratton Hawley notes in this regard that the 
gopis are traditionally women and they are the ones who are now suffering the 
separation from the male deity. By identifying with the deity, the devotee-poet who 
establishes the suffering of the woman is in effect punishing the mother-substitute for 
her own withdrawal (Hawley 2000: 248). This is a stretch. It is much more commonplace 
for devotees to identify with the gopis, in which case I maintain that the god images of 
viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti more likely reflect either a desired absence of the other 
in favor of a compensatory individuation or a truly bemoaned withdrawal of the other 
corresponding with the realities of Hindu childrearing practices revealed in 
contemporary ethnographies. 
Conclusion 
As the product of cultural idiom, family life, and private need, the Hindu god image is a 
transitional object particularly suited to the negotiations regarding the sense of self and 
other, that is, "the polarity between fusion and separation," "the essential psychological 
theme of Hindu culture" (Kakar 1981: 34). Though the foregoing argument applies 
explicitly to Hindu god imagery, it equally applies to all constructions of deity. I argue 
that the examination of any particular god image and its attendant relationship sheds 
interpretive light on the psychological needs of the religious practitioner. The prediction 
thus emerges that those who favor an uncompromised individuation will gravitate 
toward those religious traditions and their god images that maintain a distinction 
between devotee and deity; for example, the historical theisms. Alternatively, those who 
favor a sense of self enmeshed with the other - group or otherwise - will gravitate 
toward those religious traditions and their god images that facilitate a fantasy of merger. 
Whether these respective fantasies correspond with or compensate for childhood and 
adult realities is clearly relative to the cultural milieu in question. The larger point I wish 
to make here - and it is one that would be too obvious to mention if it were not for the 
many texts repeatedly intimating otherwise - is that no one culture pursues only one 
psychological developmental pathway. While it may be the case that Hindu India leans 
towards the "fusion pole," it is clear from the devotional material that several individuals 
find it attractive that on occasion the powerful other(s) is not immediately present. The 
pathology of such god imagery rests on whether or not the other is merely absent 
(healthy) or altogether annihilated. An annihilated other reflects narcissistic rage; an 
absent other reflects healthy individuation. 
The foregoing is, to my knowledge, the first attempt at an object relations and 
attachment theoretical interpretation of viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti. Such a project 
hopefully makes persuasive the argument that Hindu god imagery clearly betrays the 
psychological complexity of Hindu India, in this way offsetting the rather fashionable 
tendency to pigeonhole the religion and culture in a category characterized by fusion as 
opposed to the West's individuation. Indeed, viraha bhakti and virodha bhakti are two 
devotional models predicated precisely on the maintenance of an individuated sense of 
self in opposition to an eternally other other. Adjudicating definitively whether such 
individuation is correspondent with or compensatory for Hindu childhood must await 
another day. 
Notes  
1. It may also be noted here that authors working in the field of cross-cultural 
psychology endorse the application of object relations theory to non-Western 
cultures. For instance, the American psychoanalyst Alan Roland notes: "From 
cross-civilizational psychoanalytic work it is evident that psychoanalytic drive 
theory needs serious amending. The vicissitudes of superego and ego-ideal 
development and early object relations, all related to culture, are just as or more 
central to character development, later behavior, and the kinds of defenses that 
are emphasized than those of the drives alone" (1996: 142-43). The preeminent 
Indian psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar similarly notes, "the relational models, with 
their different understanding of human development... are congruent with the 
dominant cultural orientation and experiences of people living in the non-Western 
societies. The confinement of psychoanalysis to Western societies during the last 
eighty years and its stagnation... in India and Japan over decades may well be 
due to the individualistic premises of the drive psychology model which clash with 
the dominant cultural orientation of non- Western societies" ( 1 997: 43). 
2. Similar studies using the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme measure have 
been undertaken with respect to the Tanakh and Christian Bible. See Popp, 
Luborsky, Andrusyna, Cotsonis, and Seligman (2002); Popp, Luborsky, 
Descoteaux, Diguer, Andrusyna, Kirk, and Cotsonis (2003, 2004). 
3. Ramakrsna's biography contains the following confession: 'The buildings with 
their different parts, the temple, and everything else vanished from my sight, 
leaving no trace whatsoever, and in their stead I saw a limitless, infinite, effulgent 
Ocean of Consciousness... to swallow me up! I was panting for breath. I was 
caught in the rush and collapsed" (Nikhilananda 1984: 13-14). Likewise the 
Chandogya Upanisad famously notes, "O good-looking one, from the ocean 
these eastward rivers flow east, and these westward rivers flow west, and they 
return to the ocean. As they become (once again) the ocean, they do not 
recognize that 'I am this (river), I am that (river)' " (6.10.2; my translation). In both 
instances, the devotee is like a stream pouring into the ocean's totality. 
Alternatively, the Astdvakrasamhita notes, "You are not the body nor is the body 
in you. You are neither the enjoyer nor the doer. You are true consciousness, 
forever the witness and indifferent (to the affairs of the world). Go with 
happiness.... In you, (who are) the infinite ocean, the rising and falling of waves 
neither increase nor decrease your being" (15.4, 11; my translation). Here 
oceanic identification is reversed. Now the devotee is the ocean which subsumes 
all others. The two models betray different psychological comportments, topics to 
be addressed below. 
4. Obeyesekere defines personal symbols as follows: "cultural symbols whose 
primary significance and meaning lie in the personal life and experience of 
individuals. ...The symbol is recreated anew by the individual.... The personal 
symbol... has unconscious, deep motivation and intracommunicative 
significance" (1981: 44-46). 
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